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.... 
ELS operators rest 
beside an NPA 
truck. A large 
graveyard sprawls 
in the distance. 
they drive huge armored flails back and 
fonh over a minefield, bearing the ground 
wirh rotating chains to remove all vegeta-
tion. That's it-no clearance, no survey, 
just men with huge machines clearing rhe 
way for manual deminers or dogs to fo l-
low. Thorough area preparation removes 
annoying brush from deminers' paths and, 
more importantly, triggers any tripwires 
straddling the minefield. In Bosnia, near-
invisible tripwire filamems often lead to 
a nasty Yugoslav mine called the PROM-
1. When activated, the PROM-l 's 
explosive charge shoots upward about 
four feet before detonating, spraying 
shrapnel over a much wider area than 
conventional blast mines. Deminers re-
ally appreciate ELS' services. 
The ELS business model requires 
heavy input from Bosnian workers, de-
pending on savvy locals co help the 
company improve its operations. Accord-
ing to Mr. Paul Simmons, ELS' Bosnian 
office manager, local crews operate and 
maintain all of ELS' equipment, learn-
ing everything there is to know about 
each machine. Then, when demining 
operations cease during the winter 
months, these same crews give ELS rec-
ommendations for improving their 
machines, often doing much of the work 
themselves. Mr. Simmons added that his 
crews included Serbs, C roats, Bosnians, 
Muslims, Catholics-groups who were at 
each others' throats just seven years ago 
now hang out together at the ELS garage 
all winter, trading tool rips and shop talk. 
Entity Armies/Civil Protection 
Immediately after the war, only the 
Entity armies had any idea where mines 
mighr be- they laid many of them, after 
all. They were the first wave of demining 
activity in Bosnia. The armies' work was 
more militarily strategic than humanitarian, 
and international NGOs and commercial 
companies soon superseded them, bur their 
discipline, knowledge and decent equipment 
make them valuable assets nonetheless. As 
the NGOs and commercial companies 
slowly migrate to other demining 
hotspots, rhe Entity armies may see their 
demining workload increase. 
The armies may pick up some of the 
demining work, but they have othe r 
tasks-such as defending the counrry. 
Most demining wi ll eventually fall on 
Civil Protection forces, Bosnia's indig-
enous, civilian-run enforcement squads. 
Right now, Civi l Protection undertakes 
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a relatively small proportion of the work, 
bur in the future, when most priority 
minefields are cleared, Civil Protection 
will conduct needed spot demining and 
emergency calls whenever needed. In the 
end, Bosnians will have only Bosnians 
demining their nation: the triumphant 
endgame of the Bosnian battle against 
landmines. 
Conclusion 
In Bosnia, there hasn't been much 
difference between a realist and a cynic, 
since neither had anything positive to say 
about the future-until now. Suddenly, 
optimists are respectable people again. 
Mr. Rowe knows better than anyone the 
reasons why: "We have a new manage-
ment ream already in place-there's 
finally a real chance for stability. And the 
government, with all irs difficult circum-
stances, has begun to pick up its 
responsibilities-chat shows it's inrerested 
in getting on with business ." For the first 
rime since independence, the Bosnian 
government has conceived and executed 
a plan-the Demining Law-that paves 
the way for the resolution of a Bosnian 
problem using a Bosnian system that will 
evemually rely entirely on national re-
sources. "It's fairly simple, actually," Mr. 
Rowe explains. "We are at the point 
where the Bosnians can really take the 
lead in solving their problems, and that's 
always the best way to go!" • 
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Demining During 
Operation Enduring 
Freedom in Afghanistan 
The U.S. and Coalition forces' occupation of airfields at Bagram and 
Kandahar in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom was initially 
hampered by the presence of a large number of mines and UXO in both the 
immediate and surrounding areas of the airfields. U.S. and Coalition forces 
quickly came to understand that traditional countermine demining 
operations were insufficient to ensure troop habitability and operational 
safety in the base area, a situation not foreseen or provided for in current 
U.S. Army doctrine. This experience strongly suggests that the U.S. Army 
should assess its current countermine doctrine and introduce a doctrinal 
modification to take into account the future need to deal with mines and 
UXO in and around base areas. 
by John L. Wilkinson, Vice 
President, Operations, RONCO 
Consulting Corporation 
Introduction 
In many ways, Operation Enduring 
Freedom has diverged from the usual pat-
tern of U.S. and Coalition military 
operations that developed since the Viet-
nam War. Whether small-scale operations 
such as Urgem Fury in Grenada or Just 
Cause in Panama, or much larger-scale op-
era tions such as Desert Shield/Desert 
Srorm in the Gulf or Allied Force in Serbia, 
the usual pattern since the 1970s has been 
one of mounting operations imo enemy 
territory from friendly territory, and the 
usual pattern has been not to occupy en-
emy territory for extended periods of rime. 
While Operation Enduring Freedom 
began as did the others mentioned above, 
with the collapse of the Taliban govern-
ment, Marine, U.S. Army and Coalition 
forces occupied Bagram and Kandahar air-
fields inside Afghanistan. Both have since 
been used as semi-permanent operational 
bases from which to conduct further mili-
tary operations against the remnants ofAI 
Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan 
and adjoining border areas with Pakistan. 
This change of pattern may well be-
come more of the norm as the war against 
terrorism progresses and U.S. and Coalition 
forces find themselves operating with increas-
ing frequency from bases that are not 
necessarily in friendly or non-conflictive ter-
ritory. As a result, and based on the experience 
since February 2002 in Afghanistan, the U.S. 
Army's doctrine on dealing with mines is 
likely to require revision or, at lease, expan-
sion to account for situations such as those 
encountered in Afghanistan. 
ine Clearance vs. 
emining 
In U.S. Army doctrine, there is a 
clear delineation of responsibility between 
mine clearance operations, which are con-
ducted by the Corps of Engineers, and 
removal and disposal of UXO, which is 
the responsibility of Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal (EOD) teams attached to or 
integrated with combat units. Further-
more, there is a clear distinction in doctrine 
between mine clearance and demining; the 
latter, in fact, is nor acknowledged as a 
military mission. 
Army doctrine calls for breaching or 
clearing lines of communication through 
minefields, clearly demarcating the 
cleared borders, and moving through as 
quickly as operationally possible. A cer-
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cain number of casualties are recognized 
as inevitable in such operations. Military 
minefields are usually laid ro channel or 
delay movement, so that direct or indi-
rect fire, or both, can be brought to bear 
on an opposing force that has slowed 
down or is concentrated at certain pre-
determined points as it attempts to traverse 
or avoid the minefield. As a result, Army 
doctrine emphasizes speed in dealing with 
such obstacles so as to engage and defeat 
the enemy directly, while reducing the ex-
posure of units to enemy fire. 
At this poim, it is useful to note that 
Army doctrine on mine clearance contin-
ues co reflect readiness for a war of rapid 
movement, such as was expected in Eu-
rope and was carried out in the Gulf War. 
On d1e other hand, demining or hw11anitar-
ian demjning, where the goal is to render 
defined areas mine !Tee or, more properly, mine 
safe, is nor recognized as a military mission in 
doctrine. While it is true that U.S. Special 
Forces personnel receive training in humani-
tarian dernining at Fort Leonard Wood, they 
do so in order to reach it to foreign military 
personnel. In combat, Special Forces do nor 
have demining or humanitarian demining as 
a mission and they do not, indeed, have mine 
clearance as a mission either. 
1
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De miners work 
along-side 
landing planes 
and helicopt ers 
waiting for take-
off. 
Operation Enduring 
Freedom 
The occupation of Bagram and 
Kandahar airfields in Afghanistan, and 
their steady upgrade imo semi-permanent 
operational bases for U.S. and Coalition 
forces has highlighted this doctrinal is-
sue. Sadly, it has done so in the context 
of several casualties early in the occupa-
tion; at the same time, it has also 
highlighted for the U.S. Army the need, 
if nor to rethink and redefine doctrine, 
then to account for situations in which 
demining (as opposed to mine clearance) 
is required to ensure operational safety 
and even troop habitability. 
In their initial occupation of these 
bases, rhe Marine Expeditionary Force dis-
covered wide areas that were infested with 
mines and UXO. Addressing these threats 
was hampered by the limited availability of 
mine detectors and other equipment. As a 
result, much of the early "demining'' was 
accomplished by deploying troops in a lin e-
abreast, using their bayonets to prod the 
ground in search of mines and UXO. La-
mentably, this led ro several casualties and 
fatalities, either as a result ofaccidems while 
conducting sucl1 operations or by areas m is-
rakenly being declared as "cleared" following 
such operations. 
An early response to this siruation 
was the introduction ofJordanian Army 
Aardvark flai ls and , shortly thereafter, 
Norwegian-provided H ydrema flai ls. 
Both have since been used extensively in 
processing land within the perimeters of 
Bagram and Kandahar. The U.S. and 
Coalition forces, however, were soon ex-
posed to the reality of flai l operations: 
while rhey can "process" land (and are 
especially useful in areas where vegetation 
must be removed or minimized) and 
detonate mines, rhey are also prone to 
leaving significant numbers ofUXO, and 
some mines, in their wake. 
Since the land processed by rhe flails 
was still dangerous and unfit for habita-
tion or other operations, ARCENT 
contracted with RONCO Consulting 
Corporation to provide eight mine de-
tection dog (MOD) reams. Four were 
assigned to Bagram and four to Kandahar, 
for what was planned to be an initial six-
month period , beginning in early 
February 2002. 
The MOD reams d eployed by 
RONCO consisted of highly experienced 
dogs and their Bosnian handlers; most 
had been working together between four 
and five years and had previously worked 
in widely varying areas, including Bosnia, 
Azerbaijan, Kosovo, Namibia and 
Guantanamo Bay. The experience and suc-
cess of these teams is reflected in the fact rhat 
one of them- Jaromir Josipovic and 
Brenda-was selected by the United Nations 
International Children's Emergency Fund 
(UNICEF) and the Marshall Legacy Insti-
tute to receive a "Champions of Children" 
award in 2002, along with other luminaries 
such as Queen Noor ofJordan and Senators 
C huck Hagel and Patrick Leahy. 
Although contracted to work a six-
day work week, it soon became evident 
that, in order to provide quality assur-
ance at a pace commensurate with that 
of rhe flails and of the expansion needs 
of the military, a seven-day work week 
was necessary. As a result, after almost six 
m onths of operation, rhe eight reams had 
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provided quality assurance to more rhan 
I. I million square meters of land and in 
rhe process had discovered more rhan 
6,000 mines and UXO, which were ei-
ther collected for demolition or blown 
in place, as c ircumstances dictated. 
While most of these mines and UXO 
have been detected behind flail opera-
tions, it is significant to note rhar a 
number of anti-rank mines have been de-
tected ahead of the flails. The reason for 
this is simple: when flai l operators sus-
pected they would be processing land that 
might contain ami-rank mines, they re-
quested thar the MOD reams precede the 
flails in order to minimize or prevenr the 
possibility of a flail hitting such a mine 
and incurring major damage. 
The successful pairing of flai ls and 
M 0 Ds is evident not only in the amount 
of land that has been subject to quality 
assurance. It is also evident in the fact that 
over the course of the han dover of respon-
sibili ty from the Marine Expeditionary 
Force to the I 0' 11 Mountain Division and 
now rhe 18'" Airborne Corps, the incom-
ing units have requested that ARCENT 
retain rhe MOD reams and, in fact, that 
RONCO manual deminers be added to 
rhe quality assurance process (a rask rhar 
had been carried out by the dog handlers, 
all of whom also had demining experi-
ence). Furthermore, irs success is reflected 
in the fact that, nor only have rhe origi-
nal eigh t MOD reams been extended for 
an additional six months, bur RONCO 
has been contracted to provide eight more 
MOD reams (four Bosnian and four 
Mozambican) in Afghanistan as of Sep-
tember 2002. 
The Lessons of Afghanistan 
For the first rime in some 30 years, 
the U.S. military has been conducting 
combat and related operations from op-
erational bases located in territory that is 
only recently "friendly" and tha t is sti ll 
subject to attacks. Furthermore, these 
operational bases are located in former 
front line areas (Bagram) or areas that 
were fortified and defended by one or 
more of rhe former warring parries 
(Kandahar). This environment has intro-
duced special conditions and problems 
rhar are nor currently addressed in U.S. 
Army doctrine. 
S ignificantly, during the Vietnam 
War, rhe U.S. Army had an active mili-
tary patrol dog program, under which 
canines were trained to detect booby traps 
and trip wires in support of combat op-
erations. With the end of that war, this 
capability soon ceased to exist in the U.S. 
Army, although its basic characteristics 
lived on in Thailand's Military Dog Cen-
ter at Pak Chong. 
ln 1989, when the Soviet Union re-
treated from Afghanistan and U.S. and 
other Western foreign assistance was pro-
vided to the successive Mujahedeen 
government, Thailand's contribution was 
the introduction of explosives and 
MODs. While the MOD capability avail -
able worldwide has significantly 
expanded in the years that followed, the 
U.S. Army-which had innovated the 
use of canines in the detection of muni-
tions-lacks rhe doctrine to conduct 
other than countermine (rapid move-
ment) operations and the capability to 
undertake demining or humanitarian 
demining missions. 
The principal lesson of Operation 
Enduring Freedom is that U.S. forces are 
more likely than in the past to find them-
selves d eployed and stationed for 
relatively long periods of rime in areas 
which are either conflictive or which are 
being occupied immediately after a con-
flict. By logical extension, the war o n 
terrorism will see the deployment of sig-
nificant numbers of U.S. military 
personnel inro areas where they will be 
either participating in or directly supporr-
ing anti-terrorist and related military 
operations. The Philippines is an early ex-
ample of such a deploymem as is, to a lesser 
extent, the assistance being provided to the 
nation of Georgia. Future such deploy-
ments might well rake place in countries 
as widely varying as Colombia, Indone-
sia, Egypt and others in the Middle East. 
A common feature of these potential 
deploymems is that, by definition, the war 
on terrorism will feature operations against 
an armed enemy operating from its own 
"safe" or "home" areas. As demonstrated 
in previous guerrilla wars, ro be effective 
such operations must displace the terror-
ists from their "safe" areas and disrupt their 
own operations by conducting ami-terror-
ist operations from within such areas, nor 
from the outside. Doing so will increas-
ingly expose U.S. and Coalition forces to 
the threat of emplaced mines, booby traps 
and other UXO on a routine basis. 
A second lesson is that, at this point, 
the U.S. military is nor well-prepared tO 
meet the habitability and secure opera-
tional base requirements that arise from 
environments where mine and UXO in-
festation is a problem. This was evident in 
the early days of the Marine Expedition-
ary Force's deployment into Afghanistan, 
and has been addressed by the introduc-
tion of mechanical equipment operated by 
Coal ition forces and by contracted MOD 
and manual deminer reams to provide 
q uali ty assurance. 
W hi le the U.S. Central Command 
adapted to and found approaches to address 
the situation in which its troops found 
themselves, they did so despite doctrine. An 
early discussion between ARCENT and the 
U.S. Department ofSrate, through which 
the RONCO MOD and deminer teams 
have been contracted using Department of 
Defense funds, was on the issue of 
"counrerrnineoperarions vs. demining."The 
early insistence by AllCENT that "we do 
not engage in demining" was overcome by 
their realization that they, in fact, did not 
face a situation in whicJ, countermine op-
erations were feasible or acceptable as an 
approach to the problem. 
Recently, in a possible precursor to 
a doctrinal modification, the U.S. Army's 
Humanitarian Oemining Center at Fort 
Leonard Wood, Missouri, has been ex-
ploring al ternative approaches to the 
problem of mines and UXO, especially 
those involving the use of MODs. Since 
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their studies will most likely rake into 
account their experience in training Spe-
cial Forces personnel in humanitarian 
demining, there is a likelihood that any 
recommendations they might make will 
include the developmem of a U.S. Army 
capability to conduct both countermine 
and demining operations. Whether this 
latter capability is organic or contracted 
(or some combination of the two) is an 
open question that will, most likely, be 
influenced by budgetary and operational 
considerations. In particular, the views of 
senior U.S. Army leadership will affect 
whether a demining capability (if estab-
lished at all) is either created within a 
number of existing unirs or established as a 
free-standing, deployable capability avail-
able either serially or concurrently ro a 
number of theaters of operation. 
The third lesson of Afghanistan is 
rha t the issue of countermine vs. demining 
is, in fact, a non-issue and that it needs 
to be recognized as such. Quite simply, 
the U.S. Army must be prepared to ad-
dress both missions. The use and threat 
of mines and UXO have proliferated to 
an extent that rhey are likely to be en-
countered in almost any conceivable 
anti- terrorist operation to which the U.S. 
Army will deploy troops. Further, the 
U.S. Army may again find itself in a situ-
arion such as the Gulf War, where 
minefield breaching and coumermine op-
erations were an essential precursor to the 
rapid movement and breakout into the 
rear of Iraqi forces. 
The U.S. Army cannot choose one 
mission over the other; it will be presented 
with both threats and must be prepared 
to deal with them both. • 
'All pboros courii'Sy of RONCO. 
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